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The first country reports under the new Rule of Law mechanism have attracted
diverse commentaries by leading experts. While the European Commission has
emphasized on multiple occasions that this new mechanism is a preventative tool,
Prof. Daniel Kelemen has compared it to “installing a fire alarm when the building is
already ablaze”, considering the consistent rule of law crises in the EU. Prof. Petra
Bárd has identified numerous structural and methodological issues in the reports
and has concluded that EU institutions need to make better use of the existing tools
aimed at responding to violations of EU law.
Prof. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has not spared criticism regarding the gaps and biases in
the reports and she has raised an important question about Bulgaria — namely, why
the country’s rule of law report does not analyze why Bulgaria appears problematic
again considering the Commission recommended that the Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (CVM) be lifted for Bulgaria last year.
Indeed, the Commission’s silence about CVM in Bulgaria’s rule of law report
under the new mechanism appears suspicious, but this is by far not the only issue
regarding the interplay between the CVM and the new mechanism. In fact, all
bad habits that Bulgaria and the Commission developed under the CVM have
been transferred onto the new Rule of Law mechanism. Even worse, Borissov’s
government is attempting to use the 2020 country report to deliver yet another blow
to Bulgaria’s rule of law by putting forward an action plan which allegedly addresses
the Commission’s concerns. Moreover, a shocking proposal that became public on 3
December 2020 revealed plans for a reform that would essentially allow the General
Prosecutor to choose who will investigate him. This endeavor can only be deemed
“legal hooliganism”.
Some Awkward Prehistory
Bulgaria and Romania are the only two EU members subject to the CVM. As they did
not fulfill all accession criteria at the time of joining the EU in 2007, the Commission
put them under monitoring in the areas of rule of law and corruption in order to help
them catch up through dialogue and recommendations. In a forthcoming academic
article (“Threats to the Rule of Law: The Pitfalls of the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism”, EPL 2020, Vol. 26, Issue 3), I showcase how Bulgaria’s rule of law
severely deteriorated despite the CVM. The reasons for this are multiple. On the one
hand, the Commission was lenient regarding long-standing challenges to Bulgaria’s
rule of law within the scope of monitoring, such as the excessive, uncontrollable
powers of the Prosecutor’s Office and the politization of the Supreme Judicial
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Council. On the other hand, it verified reforms as progress, which in reality either
preserved the existing structural problems or further undermined the rule of law.
I have also vehemently criticized the Commission’s 2018 CVM report, which
declared three of Bulgaria’s benchmarks provisionally closed (judicial independence,
legal framework and organized crime), and the 2019 CVM report, which
recommended that the CVM be lifted for Bulgaria. The Commission’s conclusions in
both reports did not match the reality on the ground.
The mass protests against Boyko Borissov’s government and General Prosecutor
Ivan Geshev, which erupted in July 2020 and are still taking place, exposed
Bulgaria’s rule of law decay to an international audience, but the process certainly
does not appear to have started after the latest 2019 CVM report. Even further,
while the European Parliament took an interest in this unfortunate state of affairs
and adopted a highly critical resolution on Bulgaria’s rule of law on 8 October
2020, the Commission remained stubborn and refused to fall on its back by
assuming responsibility for its actions and omissions which contributed to Bulgaria’s
rule of law decline. This was particularly visible in a highly controversial hearing
of Commissioner Vera Jourova before the LIBE Committee of the European
Parliament during which it became clear that the Commission not only maintained
its conclusions under the CVM, but also planned to sweep the mechanism under the
carpet altogether. And so it did! We have not yet seen a 2020 CVM report.
A Biased Rule of Law Report
In this light, Bulgaria’s rule of law report under the new mechanism is interesting
because it appears like a combination of the CVM and the new methodology,
with the drawback that the Commission has inherited its bad habits from the prior
exercise. Moreover, the Commission has avoided a much-needed explanation about
its prior omissions.
A rather partial picture
It is rather odd that Bulgaria’s rule of law report has misrepresented the purpose
of the mass protests in Bulgaria. This is surely a bad habit inherited from the
CVM where the Commission deliberately avoided mentioning information which
compromised Boyko Borissov and the Prosecutor’s Office. In the words of the
Commission, the protests show “discontent in society with the lack of progress
in effectively fighting corruption”. However, these protests have two very clear
addressees: the alleged corruption of the government of Boyko Borissov and the
corruption of the Prosecutor’s Office, especially General Prosecutor Ivan Geshev.
Moreover, while mentioning less important scandals such as “ApartmentGate”, the
Commission has avoided referring to any of the major scandals implicating Borissov
and Geshev, which shook Bulgaria this year, including the raid against Bulgaria’s
Presidency which triggered the mass protests.
A second bad habit inherited from the CVM is that the Commission takes words
by Bulgarian institutions at face value. Particularly striking is the Commission’s
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empathy towards the Prosecutor’s Office which has complained from lack of
“financial resources” which allegedly hamper its work. Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office
is notorious for its unwise spending which has raised many controversies. Only in
2020, citizens learned that millions had been poured into the development of a police
force attached to the Prosecutor’s Office, which is highly non-transparent and which
has an unclear constitutional basis. The President of the Supreme Court Lozan
Panov has overtly called it a “paramilitary structure”. It was with this department that
the Prosecutor’s Office raided Bulgaria’s Presidency in 2020, nonetheless.
A white-washed Commission
It is surely odd that the Commission repeated its mantra from the CVM that “a
solid track record of final convictions in high-level corruption cases remain[ed] to
be established”, while forgetting that in order for these to materialize and to have
legal value, there needs to be an objective investigation and a fair trial in which
fundamental rights are respected by an independent judiciary.
None of the serious allegations against Borissov, his ministers and Ivan Geshev
can be investigated objectively because of the current state of affairs to which the
Commission has contributed via the CVM. In this rule of law report on Bulgaria we
learn that the “lack of a possibility for an effective criminal investigation concerning
the Prosecutor General and his or her deputies is a long standing issue” in Bulgaria.
However, what did the Commission do to help resolve this problem in the 13 years
of monitoring under the CVM? In a prior article, I have explained how, unlike the
Commission, which has remained relatively nonchalant regarding this problem in the
CVM reports, the Council of Europe has engaged in a true cat-and-mouse game with
Bulgaria in a genuine attempt to make it comply with Kolevi v Bulgaria.
Moreover, Borissov and his ministers cannot be objectively investigated either
since the Prosecutor’s Office not only has a vertical, Soviet structure where all
decisions depend on the General Prosecutor, but also that person is elected by a
heavily politicized Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). This is a problem to which the
Commission contributed via the CVM because it recognized a highly controversial
reform of the institution as progress in the 2016 CVM report despite protests by the
judiciary. In fact, in the current rule of law report, the Commission continues to insist
that this reform constituted progress.
Unlike this year’s highly critical resolution on Bulgaria by the European Parliament
which mentions the government’s assault against fundamental rights, the
Commission has completely turned a blind eye to this matter in Bulgaria’s rule
of law report. But how could it open its eyes since it recognized crackdowns on
fundamental rights as progress in the CVM reports in prior years? While it is
commendable that the Commission recognizes, in the current report, that “the risk to
judicial independence is evidenced by the number of judges subject to attacks”, it is
quite surprising that the Commission closed the judicial independence benchmark in
the CVM in 2018 when, at the time, there was even more evidence of such attacks,
including targeted harassment of the highest-ranking judges?
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Borissov’s Latest Trickery
Borissov’s government has inherited some bad habits from the CVM as well. While
the new rule of law mechanism does not require EU members to publicly address
the Commission’s concerns in the rule of law report, Borissov’s government has
engaged in an exercise which unwittingly reveals what happened in the CVM
kitchen. It has published an action plan in which it explains how it will address the
Commission’s concerns and observations in Bulgaria’s rule of law report.
While those unfamiliar with the Bulgarian context may find this commendable,
those following Bulgaria’s rule of law decline immediately know that Borissov’s
government will pretend it is concerned about the Commission’s findings only to
further undermine Bulgaria’s rule of law. Established attorney and government critic
Georgi Atanassov has already qualified the action plan as an example of “complete
lack of legal adequacy” and has concluded that its purpose was to present legal
illiteracy and legal nihilism in a shape acceptable for Brussels. Indeed, there is a lot
of verbiage, including many meaningless proposals, such as an initiative to introduce
high school and university students to the work of the judiciary. However, there are
also many proposals which either constitute assaults against Bulgaria’s Constitution
or attempts to pretend that work is taking place regarding long-standing challenges
of Bulgaria’s justice system.
Atanassov himself is particularly concerned that in blatant violation of the principle
of separation of powers, the Council of Ministers has distributed tasks to institutions,
which are part of the judiciary, and has given them deadlines to write reports and to
propose legislative changes even though they do not have the right to legal initiative.
The Prosecutor’s Office, for instance, has been asked to put forward proposals
for amendments of Bulgaria’s Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure.
Atanassov is also rightfully scandalized by the fact that the Prosecutor’s Office has
been asked to analyze and draw conclusions about corruption cases, including about
efficiency and organization. In essence, this means it has been asked to evaluate
the work of judges — for critics, it is quite transparent this implies the courts should
be blamed for the lack of results in fighting corruption, a pleaser for Borissov’s and
Geshev’s ears.
Meanwhile, not only the Council of Ministers is increasing the already excessive
powers of the Prosecutor’s Office but is also trying desperately to avoid introducing
checks and balances in the institution. In the action plan, it has pompously
announced that it will put forward a proposal for reform before Parliament and will
ask it to submit it for an opinion before the Venice Commission. Sadly, this game
has been played many times before: Borissov’s governments have submitted
several questionable proposals for reform of the Prosecutor’s Office before the
Venice Commission in the past. Even more shockingly, the proposal, which became
public on 3 December 2020, can only be deemed an example of legal hooliganism
because, as journalist Krasen Nikolov has observed: the General Prosecutor, in
essence, will choose who will investigate him.
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Is There Hope?
The question that remains is whether the Commission will turn a blind eye to
Borissov’s latest trickery. I have analyzed the pitfalls of the CVM which I consider
a failure. I have also witnessed how the Commission plays along with Borissov
on other matters. Even though Borissov’s 2020 proposal for a new Constitution
was deemed incompetent by key experts in Bulgarian constitutional law, the
Commission still recommended that Borissov essentially waste the time of the
Venice Commission by submitting it for an opinion. The opinion, in the end, was
highly critical, which made Borissov take a step back and abandon the ideas for
a grand national assembly, but Borissov achieved his goal of buying time and
delaying resignation — the very purpose of his constitutional proposal. As a result,
I do not have much hope. The rule of law mechanism seems like an “Eeny, Meeny,
Miny Moe” exercise in which Bulgaria has been counted out for proper rule of law
monitoring.
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